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1 Introduction
There are a number of public inputs which are essentialto productive activities.
Examples of public inputs are infrastructures(for example, transportation and
telecommunication systems, water and energy supply), basic research, police
and legal services, education and environment preservation. A common feature
of these public inputs is that theirbenefits are being enjoyed simultaneously by
a number of firms. Providing adequate public inputs is an important task for
the government to enhance domestic industries' competitiveness in the interna-
tionalmarket.
In this paper, we provide a graphical exposition of the Pareto-optimal
provision of public inputs and itsimplication on the validityof the conventional
trade theorems. Despite the long tradition of the international trade theory,
diagramatic approach to examine the comparative staticresults has not been
attempted in the presense of public inputs. Public inputs are incorporated into
the Ricardo-Viner model of international trade theory by treating them as
intermediate non-traded goods with public good characteristics.It should be
noted at the outset that trade-theoreticresults discussed in our paper are not
new. The model and the notion of equilibrium in our paper can be found in
Khan (1983) which shows that,with proper modifications, the basic theorems of
internationaltrade stillhold in the presence of public inputs. This paper com-
－146(153)－
―145(154) ―
PublicInputs and InternationalTrade: A Graphical Exposition of the Ricardo-Lindahl Model
plements the analysis of the Ricardo-Lindahl model in Khan (1983). Namely,
by using a graphical exposition, we can explicitly show the changes in the level
of public inputs which turns out to play a crucial role in determining the
Rybczynski effect and the Stolper-Samuelson effect.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and defines the Lindahl equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the Pareto optimality
of the Lindahl equilibrium by introducing the diagram. In Section 4, we turn to
the analysis of international trade.
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where q is the marginal cost of public input.
In the Lindahl equilibrium, personalized prices are imposed according to
the marginal benefits each producer gains from the use of public inputs. Let q＼
denote the personalized prices (or Lindahl taxes) for sector i, then we can write
These correspond to equations (2.1) in Khan (1983). Equation (9) can be seen
as the government's budget constraint.
Note that Equation (8) and (9) can be obtained by the following govern-
ment's maximization problem under the competitive labor market.
where L* denotes the equilibrium allocation of labor which satisfies the
marginal productivity condition (6). The government maximizes the interna-
tionalvalue of GNP, PfXf+pmXm, with respect to G. By settingthe Lagrangean
multiplier on the resource constraint to be equal to w, the first-ordercondition
implies
－142(157)－
In this section we graphically illustratethe Lindahl equilibrium defined in the
previous section.21 We will see that the use of the diagram is convenient for
analyzing the Pareto optimality condition for public input provision.
Extending the work of Samuelson (1954), Kaizuka (1968) and Sandmo
(1975) derived the Pareto optimal condition for providing public inputs assum-
ing constant returns to scale technology. The condition indicates the sum of the
marginal rate of substitutionbetween public inputs and privateinputs is equal to
the marginal cost of public input. Since the condition is analogous to the one in
Samuelson (1954) for public consumption goods, we call it the Samuelson-
Kaizuka-Sandmo condition. In the context of our model, the Samuelson-
Kaizuka-Sandmo condition can be written as:
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implies the Pareto optimal condition pertaining to public input provision. Then,
we depict the Lindahl equilibrium and show its Pareto-optimality. As a pre-
liminary to the analysis of international trade, properties of the Pareto optimal
allocation are also examined in section 3.2.
3.1 Lindahl Equilibrium and the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo Condition
The following equilateral triangle is an analogue of the Edgeworth box diagram.
The vertical distance from point E to each side of the triangle measures the
amount of labor allocated to each sector; the vertical distances from point E to
side AB, AC and BC represent the amount of labor allocated to sector /, m and
g respectively. Let the height of the triangle be L. Since the sum of all
distances is always equal to the height of the triangle, any point within the
triangle represents an allocation, i.e.,it always satisfies the resource constraint
for labor, Lf + Lm+Lg = L.
The isoquants for output / can be drawn on a skewed plane BA ― BC
taking B as the origin. Using (3), Lg = agG, G can be projected onto the axis
BA and L/ onto BC. Bf represents T/f^/ and Bg represents ^agG^ Since these
projections are proportional to L/ and G, we can simply transfer the familiar
isoquants drawn in the orthogonal plane to the skewed plane BA ―BC. The
isoquants drawn in the skewed plane preserve the following properties; they are
convex to the origin B and the contour corresponds to a higher output level as
it moves away from the origin. (See Figure 1.)
With regard to the 'slope' of the isoquant, we need a more careful interpre-
tation.41It is useful to introduce new but familiar coordinates, x and y, to meas-
ure the slopes. (See Figure 1.) The x and y coordinates of point E on the
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The advantage of using the triangleis that it explicitly brings out the
public good characteristicsof G. At E, the same amount of G is employed in
both sectors.
Next, we depict efficientallocationsin the diagram. Pareto optimality im-
plies the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition to hold. The marginal rates of
substitutionbetween labor and public input are no longer required to be equal-
ized between sectors,hence the usual box diagram is unsuitable to depict the
efficientallocations because tangencies between the isoquants for each sector
does not imply efficiency. The triangle diagram, however, stillallows us to
depict the efficientallocations by the locus of all the 'tangencies'between the
isoquants of the two sectors. The line PO in Figure 2 depicts the efficiency
locus. The properties of the efficiency locus is discussed in the following
subsection.
We can establishthe following result.
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indicates that the Lindahl equilibrium is Pareto optimal;
Lemma 2 In Lindahl equilibrium, the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition is
satisfied.
Proof. Dividing (9) with w yields
PfFfG PmFmG+ = ag (15)
w w
We can rewrite this expression using the marginal productivity pricing of labor
(6), and obtain the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition
FfL FmL
Corresponding to E are the equilibrium output levels X^ and X*m. Labor allo-
cations for the production of X^r and X*m, L*f,L*m and G*, are measured by the
verticaldistances from E to AB, AC and BC respectively. The diagram also
indicates the amount of Lindahl taxes incurred by each sector,q＼G. Since along
the BC axis G = 0, the verticaldistance from point Y, where the cost line YY
intersectsBC, to BA indicates the totalcost of producing Xf measured in terms
of labor. Using the projection on the BC axis, we can see that BY is ^ times
the totalcost,Ba is the share of labor cost and aY is the share of Lindahl taxes
incurred by sector /, qjG. Similarly, the share of Lindahl taxes incurred by
sector m, qmG is given by Yb.
3.2 Properties of the Efficiency Locus
We have seen that the Lindahl equilibrium lies on the efficiency locus along
which the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition is satisfied.In order for the
comparative staticanalysis of the Lindahl equilibrium,itis useful to know the
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shape of the efficiencylocus.
With additional assumptions on the relative factor intensity, efficiency
locus has the following properties.
Lemma 3 The efficiencylocus lies to the right of AD in Figure 3 when sector
m is more public input intensive relativeto sector f. The efficiencylocus lies
to theleft:of AD when sector f is more public input intensive relativeto sector
m and itnever crosses the line AD.
Suppose a point of the efficiencylocus lies on the line AD. Along the line
AD, Lf = Lm always holds, hence sector / and m have an identicallabor-public
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input ratio.In the absence of the factorintensity reversals,the efficiency locus
necessarilycoincides with AD. The two sectors share identical marginal rates of
substitutionbetween labor and public input. This also implies that when factor
intensitiesdifferbetween sectors,the efficiencylocus will never cross the line
AD.
The efficiencylocus when sector m is relativelypublic input intensive is
depicted in the figure. Let us define 7,-= ^. Then we have 7/ > 7m. Point a
where the isoquant for sector m is tangent to the line AD lies above point b
where the isoquant for sector / is tangent to. This indicates that when the two
isoquants have the same marginal rate of substitution,6'we can observe 7/ > 7OT.
An immediate implication of the relative factor intensity is that when
sector m is more public input intensive, an equilibrium allocation must be
located in ADC in which 7/ > 7OTis always satisfied.If sector / is more public
input intensive, an equilibrium allocationis in ABD where 7/ < 7m is satisfied.
For further determining the slope of the efficiencylocus, an assumption on
the relative size of the elasticityof substitutionbetween sectors is necessary.
With constant returns to scale technology, the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and public inputs, which we denote by MRS{ = |K depends
solely on the factor proportions, 7,-;as 7,-increases, MRSi increases.7'However,
whether the efficiencylocus is sloped upward or downward depends on the re-
sponsiveness of MRSj as 7,-changes. Such responses are represented by the
elasticityof factor substitution,07, which we define to be ,.7lv―'-.
Lemma 4 Suppose Xf is increased and Xm is decreased along the efficiency
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locus, then
i) 7/ increases and 7W decreases,
ii)- a) if OfL~/~< 9mL f"-,G increases and
ii)-b)if9fLg>$mL-^,G decreases.
Proof, i) Since the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo condition,(10), is always satis-
fied,the sum of marginal rate of substitutionbetween pubic input and labor for
each sectoris constant. The fact that the higher (lower) marginal rate of substi-
tution,MRSj, corresponds to higher (lower) labor-public input ratio,7,,implies
that 7/ and 7OT change in the opposite directions. If MRSf increases due to an
increase in 7/, MRSm must decrease so as to satisfy(10), which implies a
decrease in 7m. Conversely, an increase in 7m also implies a decrease in 7/.
Under constant returns to scale technology, we can write production functions
to be
Xf = Ff(Lf,G) = Gff(y),f;>0
Xm = Fm(Lm, G) = G /m(7≪),fm > 0
Since 7/ and 7OT move in opposite directions,the above equations indicate that
an increase in Xf and a declinein Xm implies 7/ to rise and 7m to decrease,
ii) Dividing (4) by G gives us
L
lf + lm + ag=-
This indicates that whether G increases or decreases depends on the magnitude
of the changes in 7/ and ^m. If the size of the increase in 7/ exceeds that of 7OT,
we can infer G to decrease (hence the term ―
^
gets smaller).
From (10), we know that dMRSf=―dMRSm. Hence, what remains to be
seen is whether -^^ is greater or smaller than J^ s . We define the marginal
－133(166)－






where 9* = Jg and 9iG = Jg We have ^ < £fc if and only if **£ <
QmLir-, which resultin an increase in G. When ^r^- > .^ , we have QfL^L>
RmL jr~, which leads to a decrease in G. I
The efficiencylocus drawn in Figure 3 represents the case of ii) - b). As Xf
increases and Xm decreases, point e on the efficiencylocus moves to e'.As a
result,from i) in the lemma, both Be and Cc rotate clockwise. (This only indi-
cates that e' lies within ceC; the slope of the efficiencylocus can be either up-
ward or downward sloping.) The efficiencylocus slopes upward if G increases
and downward if G decreases, (e' lies within ced if G increases and it lies
within deC if G decreases.)Since e is chosen arbitrarily,from ii)in thelemma,
the efficiencylocus is downward sloping if ##,-^-> 9^ fR-,and is upward slop-
ing if 9fi.jL<8mL%.
4 Comparative Static Analysis
In this subsection we explore some comparative staticsresults of the Lindahl
equilibrium using the diagram. We can confirm the results obtained by the
Ricardo-Lindahl model in Khan (1983).
We firstexamine the relationship between p,'s and factor prices, w* and
<7*'s.Under constant returns to scale technology and the absence of joint
production, we can write the cost functions for each sector as
Pi = waniw, qf,qm) + qiaiG(w,qf,qm)
where an and aic are the amount of labor and public input required for the
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production of a unit output. Along with the government's budget constraint,
Qf + om = wag, the equilibrium w and <?,･are determined solely by /Vs. The
decomposition property of the model8' is now clear. Thus, international trade
leads to factor price as well as Lindahl price equalization.
The relationshipbetween the relativeoutput price,~, and the relativefactor
price,^, can be described as follows.
Lemma 5 A rise in ― increases -^and decreases ^f. A decline in ^- decreases
-^and increases ^f.




where an and UiG are the amount of labor and public input required for the





From (9), we have ^ = ag ―^. The relativeprice uniquely determines ^, and
hence ^ through (9), independent of factor endowments. The above equation
now takes a form
n ≫+;≫
Pm anL + (ag - ^)amG
On totallydifferentiating,we obtain
－130(169)－
where we have used the cost minimization condition a^L + ^a^} = 0 and
4* + <fiz
~
>'mo = 0. From (9), dXft =- J<*>. Hence,
g^
< 0. I
The relationshipbetween the relativeoutput price, -*-,and the Lindahl tax-
wage ratio,^, are represented by PP in the Figure 4 below. This resultis in the
spiritof the Ricardo-Viner model; in a competitive market, a rise in say Pf
while pm being constant,leads to increase in q/ and w, which in turn reduces
qm because pm has not changed. We can perceive #,-'sto be the factor prices of
fictitiousfactors which are specificto each sector.
―129(170) ―
PP illustratesa positive relationshipbetween ― and ^, and a negative rela-
tionship between ― and
qm. -*■is measured on the horizontal axis taking Of as
the origin,while ^f is measured from the Om. From (9), the distance between
Of and Om is equal to ag.
Next, we examine the effectsof the changes in output prices on output lev-
els of both finalgoods and public inputs.
We can now observe that as the relative output price, %-, goes up, ^
increases which means YY gets flatter and the equilibrium moves to E'. Recall
that when sector m is more public input intensive relative to sector / and
9jl^-> QmL;pS the efficiency locus is downward sloping as shown in the
figure. Hence an increase in % leads to i) an increase in Xf, ii) a decrease in Xm,
iii) a decrease in G. The cost share of public inputs increases in sector / while
it decreases in sector m. {qf increases and qm decreases.)
It should be noted that the well behaved result shown above hinges on the
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An increase in L expands the equilateraltriangle from ABC to A'B'C,
where dL is equal to an increase in the height of the triangle.Vectors B'E and
assumption on the relative size of Onj1-^, that is the elasticity adjusted factor
intensity, because it determines the direction of the changes in G. When an
increase in the relative price of / induces a reduction in G, the output of the
labor intensive commodity / increases and the output of the public-input-
intensive commodity m decreases. The Rybczynski-like effect due to the change
in G is observed here.
Finally, we turn to the effects of changes in the level of labor supply on
output levels, it has been shown that an increase in the supply of labor results
in a proportional output increases in both sectors and the level of public input.10'
－127(172)－
C'E reflectnew equilibrium output levels of commodity / and m. As a conse-
quence of the factor price equalization, changes in the endowment level does
not affect equilibrium factor prices.Therefore, L does not alterthe labor-public
input ratio,^; the slopes of B'E and C'E remains the same as those of BE and
CE.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined the Pareto-optimal condition for public input
provision and implications for basic trade theorems in the context of a small
open economy. Public inputs were introduced to the conventional trade theory
of the Ricardo-Viner model. Since the government endogenously determines the
optimal level of public inputs according to the Samuelson-Kaizuka-Sandmo
condition, the changes in thelevel of public input turns out to play an important
role in determining the direction of changes in outputs.An increase in an output
price raises wage and the Lindahl prices for that sector but reduces the Lindahl
price for the other sector,which affectsthe optimal level of public inputs and
thus the output levels. Diagramatic analysis presented in this paper brings out
such response of public inputs to the changes in output prices.
It should be noted that our analysis was confined to the case of constant
returns to scale technology, i.e.,the 'unpaid factors of production' type public
inputs. This assumption gurantees the transformation curve to be concave and
thus the existence of the Lindahl equilibrium, which allows us to generalize
conventional trade theorems. When public inputs generate scale economy,
Lindahl-tax scheme may no longer be applicable.10
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